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ABSTRACT 
I examine the impact of management cash flow forecasts on market participants, 
including investors and analysts. I posit and find that the news in management cash 
flow forecasts is priced beyond the news in total earnings. Furthermore, analyst 
earnings forecast revisions relate positively to the news in management cash flow 
forecasts. I also find that the impact of management cash flow forecasts varies 
predictably across firms based on certain characteristics. The market’s positive pricing 
of cash flow forecast news is greater for firms with bad earnings news, for financially 
distressed firms, for growth firms, and for firms with relatively higher value relevance 
of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. The positive relation between 
analyst earnings forecast revision and the news in management cash flow forecast is 
also greater for firms with bad earnings news, and for firms with relatively higher value 
relevance of reported cash flows. Additional tests document that management cash flow 
forecasts are associated with lower analyst forecast error and lower forecast dispersion 
in general and especially for firms with relatively more value-relevant reported cash 
flows. My study provides information to market participants, managers, auditors, and 
researchers by documenting the consequences of voluntary disclosure in the area of 
management cash flow forecasts. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The incentives, the determinants, the consequences, and the properties of 
management voluntary disclosure have been examined empirically in many different 
contexts. With respect to managers’ voluntary forecasts, the existing literature focuses 
nearly exclusively on earnings forecasts. In this study, I examine voluntary disclosure 
under the context of management cash flow forecasts. Specifically, I investigate the 
impact that management cash flow forecasts have on market participants by examining 
whether the market prices the news in management cash flow forecasts in the presence 
of total earnings news and whether analysts respond to such forecasts by revising their 
earnings forecasts. More importantly, I investigate whether firm characteristics 
determine the degree to which the market prices and analysts respond to cash flow news 
differently from the accrual information embedded in management forecasts. To the 
extent that the cash flow component of earnings is more/less value-relevant than is the 
accrual component for certain firms, the impact that managers’ cash flow forecasts have 
on market participants is expected to vary predictably across firms. The firm 
characteristics that I examine include contemporaneous bad news in earnings, financial 
distress, firm growth, and value relevance of reported cash flows relative to that of 
reported accruals.  
The overall expectation that management cash flow forecasts will affect market 
participants is not clear. To the extent that cash flows are one component of earnings 
and management cash flow forecasts are often issued in conjunction with earnings 
forecasts, the information in cash flows may be embedded in earnings news. Thus, I 
consider that my tests are tests of the effect of management cash flow forecasts on (1) 
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the market’s differential pricings of earnings components in the presence of 
contemporaneous earnings news and (2) on analyst earnings forecasts. 
Several previous studies document that the value relevance of cash flows is 
incremental to that of accruals (i.e., accrual-based earnings). However, no study tests 
this in the context of management forecasts. Management cash flow forecasts may not 
be perceived as credible by market participants if they believe such forecasts reflect 
managers’ opportunistic behavior, as opposed to managers’ commitment to reliably 
communicate relevant information. At the same time, management cash flow forecasts 
could provide additional credibility to forecasted earnings by disciplining managers’ 
accrual manipulation behavior. This could be the case because providing forecasts of 
both cash flows and earnings is equivalent to also providing a forecast of accruals. 
Furthermore, the ability of a forecast to signal credible, relevant information is expected 
to vary across firm characteristics. Prior research provides relatively less evidence on 
the cross-sectional incremental value relevance of cash flows, especially from a 
management forecast perspective. 
I find that, controlling for the news in total earnings, the market prices the news 
in management cash flow forecasts positively and that analysts revise their earnings 
forecasts upward (downward) following good (bad) news management cash flow 
forecasts. Distinguishing firms by their unique characteristics, I find that the market’s 
positive pricing of the news in management cash flow forecasts is greater for firms with 
bad news in earnings, for firms in financial distress, for growth firms, and for firms with 
relatively higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. 
Furthermore, the positive association between the news in management cash flow 
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forecasts and analyst earnings forecast revisions is greater for firms with bad earnings 
news and for firms that the cash flow component is more value-relevant than is the 
accrual component of earnings. In additional tests, I document that analyst earnings 
forecast error and forecast dispersion are smaller for firms that provide management 
cash flow forecasts. My results identify the circumstances under which management 
cash flow forecasts are more useful for decision making and have a greater impact on 
market participants. 
While several studies investigate cash flow forecasts of analysts, only two recent 
studies examine management cash flow forecasts. Wasley and Wu (2006) study the 
determinants of management cash flow forecasts. Their primary conclusion is that 
managers are more likely to issue cash flow forecasts when investors demand such 
information and when managers perceive benefits from providing such forecasts. Cao et 
al. (2009) take a further step by examining the incentives of “soft-talk” management 
cash flow forecasts. They document the association between “soft-talk” cash flow 
forecasts and litigation risk, financial distress, actual cash flow performance, analyst 
following, and the issuance of prior cash flow forecasts.  
These two studies together provide rationales for why managers voluntarily 
issue cash flow forecasts and why they exert discretion over how informative and 
credible such forecasts could be. The reasons behind the disclosure and the discretion 
allude to managerial incentives, the perceived economic benefits to the firm, litigation 
risk, and signaling. However, these studies focus on the a priori determinants of 
management cash flow forecasts but do not specifically examine the ex post impact of 
management cash flow forecasts. Leuz and Wysocki (2010) call for more empirical 
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research on the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure and disclosure 
regulation. My study answers their call and investigates various aspects of the impact of 
voluntary disclosure in the context of management cash flow forecasts. I address the 
questions of whether management cash flow forecasts affect market participants (i.e., 
provide information to investors and financial analysts) and how this impact varies 
cross-sectionally. Empirical results support the argument that management cash flow 
forecasts affect the market’s pricing and the analyst’s expectation of earnings 
components in the presence of total earnings information. 
My findings should be of interest to managers, financial analysts, investors, 
auditors, and researchers. For managers, understanding the impact of management cash 
flow forecasts is important because it informs whether their information dissemination 
is successful and has the intended effect. Management forecasts are also important for 
financial analysts in helping them to formulate better expectations about the future 
earnings potential of the firm. Market participants may benefit from management cash 
flow forecasts by helping them to value the company and better understand the cash 
flow versus accrual components of earnings.  
In addition, auditors may be interested in the impact of management cash flow 
forecasts. Many of these forecasts are made with the release of audited financial 
statements.  This increases audit effort and risk. Auditors are required to review any 
information voluntarily disclosed by the managers in the documents that accompany 
audited financial statements, even though they are not required to audit such disclosures 
made voluntarily by the managers. This requirement is stated in Statement of Auditing 
Standards Nos. 8, Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial 
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Statements (AICPA 1985). Recent research (Krishnan et al. 2009) documents increased 
audit fees associated with firms issuing management earnings guidance due to the 
perceived higher litigation risk by the auditors.  
Finally, my study also informs researchers by extending the literature on 
voluntary disclosure in the area of management cash flow forecasts, which has been 
scarce. The sample period I adopt is 2004–2008, which extends Wasley and Wu’s 
(2006) and Cao et al.’s (2010) sample period of 1993–2003. I provide detailed 
examination of the ex post impact of management cash flow forecasts, with the focus on 
capital market (investors and analysts). In addition, I investigate the specific contexts 
under which the impact of such forecasts on capital market is greater, i.e., management 
cash flow forecasts provide more information to investors and analysts in terms of the 
differential pricings of earnings components and of analyst earnings forecast revisions.  
In the next chapter, I discuss the background, related literature, and hypotheses 
development. Chapter III provides research designs for empirical tests. In Chapter IV, I 
describe data collection and sample selection process, along with descriptive statistics. I 
provide test results and analyses in Chapter V. Chapter VI concludes the study. 
 
CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Theories of Voluntary Disclosure 
Corporate disclosure is an important means for management to communicate 
firm performance and future prospects to market participants. Managers can provide 
private information through financial reporting and voluntary disclosure to external 
capital providers to alleviate agency conflicts, modeled by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
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and to signal the type of their firms to reduce information asymmetry problems (Akerlof 
1979). Early studies (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981), based 
on adverse selection, predict that managers disclose all value-relevant information (full 
disclosure). However, later analytical work points out that there are constraints 
associated with disclosure. Proprietary costs limit manager’s willingness to disclose 
(Verrecchia 1983). Disclosing too much firm-specific information may cause the firms 
to lose their competitive advantage. Dye (1985), and Jung and Kwon (1988) assume 
uncertainty about whether managers have private information to disclose. They derive a 
separating equilibrium and demonstrate that firms with good news disclose and firms 
with bad news withhold information.  
Motivation for voluntarily disclosure can be twofold. First, managers’ 
voluntarily disclose information to reduce information asymmetry between themselves 
and investors. Voluntary disclosure allows managers to convey private information and 
signal future prospects to the market. This is particularly true for firms with more severe 
information asymmetry problems, such as small and growth firms. The informational 
need indicates that managers believe that their firms are misvalued and intend to use 
voluntary disclosure to correct the market’s perceptions of the firms. Second, voluntary 
disclosure may also arise from managers’ self-interested motives. Managers can exert 
the discretion over the timing, the quality, and the quantity of the disclosure to hype 
stock prices for personal benefits or to guide down market expectations to avoid 
negative surprises and the subsequent negative equity valuation. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that because of the information asymmetry 
problem, managers are willing to forego profitable investment projects and avoid 
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raising external capital. Disclosure policy has been shown in the literature as a 
mechanism to mitigate such problems (Bushman and Smith 2001; Verrecchia 2001; 
Stein 2003). Managers can voluntarily disclose financial information to signal the type 
of their firms and obtain external financing at lower costs to fund their growth 
opportunities. Managers will do so if they deem the benefits of disclosing outweigh the 
costs. With more public information, the liquidity of the firm’s stock increases 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) and the cost of capital decreases (Lambert at el. 2007).  
 
Empirical Evidence Related to Voluntary Disclosure in General 
The incentives, the determinants, the consequences, and the properties of 
voluntary disclosure have been examined empirically under many different contexts. 
Prior research provides abundant evidence supporting the benefits of voluntary 
disclosure. For example, voluntary disclosure is demonstrated to be associated with 
reduced cost of equity capital for firms with lower analyst following (Botosan 1997), 
lower cost of debt (Sengupta 1998), enhanced liquidity of the stock market (Healy et al. 
1999; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), and higher valuation of the firm (Barton and 
Waymire 2004). The costs of voluntary disclosure are shown in various studies, 
including the direct preparation and dissemination costs (Ribstein 2005) and indirect 
proprietary cost (Harris 1998; Leuz 2004), which can be substantial. Litigation risk 
associated with voluntary disclosure may be another concern of managers and 
discourage them from disclosing voluntarily (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1997; 
Johnson et al. 2001). 
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Prior literature focuses primarily on management earnings forecasts made in 
conference calls, earnings announcements, and press releases. Only two recent studies 
in the literature investigate management cash flow forecasts. Wasley and Wu (2006) 
examine the determinants of management cash flow forecasts. They document that 
managers issue cash flow forecasts in the period when there is a large increase in 
operating cash flows, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to 
precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flows versus accruals. 
Additionally, they find managers disclose good news in cash flows in an attempt to 
reduce the negative effect of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in 
earnings, and to signal economic viability of young firms. They also find that 
management cash flow forecasts mostly convey good news information, as opposed to 
bad news information in management earnings forecasts. While their study offers a list 
of motives behind management cash flow forecasts, they do not examine the impact of 
such forecasts on capital market participants or how that impact varies across firms. 
Cao et al. (2009) use a subsample of firms in Wasley and Wu (2006) to 
distinguish management’s faithful and “soft-talk” cash flow forecasts. They find that 
many management cash flow forecasts are issued with an unclear definition of cash 
flows that has low ex post verifiability. These forecasts are associated with an optimistic 
bias and investors do not find these “soft-talk” cash flow forecasts credible. Cao et al. 
(2009) reason that management’s decision to issue “soft-talk” cash flow forecasts is 
related to litigation risk, financial distress, actual cash flows performance, analyst 
following, and the issuance of prior cash flow forecasts. Their study examines the stock 
price reaction to management cash flow forecasts distinguishing the forecasts with 
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GAAP-based and discretionary definition of cash flows. My study complements theirs 
in that I test for the cross-sectional differences in the impact of management cash flow 
forecasts on the market’s differential pricings of earnings components and that on 
analyst earnings forecasts in different contexts based upon distinct firm characteristics. 
In sum, the recent trend in the increasing amounts of analyst and management 
cash flow forecasts provides ample opportunity for research.
1
 However, most studies 
focus on analyst cash flow forecasts and rely on readily available data from I/B/E/S. 
Wasley and Wu (2006) and Cao et al. (2009) are the only studies that examine cash 
flow forecasts by management. To the extent that managers are the primary information 
providers and may have incentives to behave opportunistically while analysts are a 
sophisticated group of market participants who respond to and help disseminate the 
information provided by managers, management and analyst cash flow forecasts 
potentially have different implications to market participants. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
Market Pricing of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts  
In this section, I discuss the market’s pricing of the news in management cash 
flow forecasts in the presence of total earnings news. Such an investigation essentially 
becomes one that tests for the differential pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts than that of the news related to accruals.  
Because management cash flow forecasts are a relatively new phenomenon, 
extant research has focused on the pricing of reported cash flows beyond reported 
                                                 
1
 For evidence of the increasing trend in analyst cash flow forecasts, see, e.g., DeFond and Hung (2003), 
Brown and Pinello (2008), and Call (2008). Wasley and Wu (2006) demonstrate a similar increasing 
trend for management cash flow forecasts.  
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accruals. Prior studies typically conclude that the pricing of the cash flow component of 
reported earnings is greater than that of reported accruals (Rayburn 1986; Bowen et al. 
1987). The primary reason attributed to the greater pricing of cash flows is their greater 
persistence for future earnings (Barth et al. 1999). As discussed previously, it is not 
necessarily the case that the news in management cash flow forecasts will have the 
same impact on market participants as do reported amounts, and prior research has yet 
to examine the cross-sectional determinants of the impact of management cash flow 
forecasts. Cash flows are one component of earnings, and cash flow forecasts may be 
partially embedded in earnings forecasts. As a result, the market may not price cash 
flow information contained in management cash flow forecasts beyond the existing 
earnings information. This is especially the case when market participants perceive that 
such forecasts reflect managers’ opportunistic behavior, as opposed to their 
commitment to reliably communicate relevant information. Cao et al. (2009) document 
that managers may issue cash flow forecasts with unclear definition that are perceived 
to be less credible by the market. Hugon and Lin (2010) also find that one-third of 
management earnings forecasts are misleading (i.e., less accurate than the existing 
consensus analyst forecasts) and that investors and analysts discount such misleading 
forecasts. 
Regarding the impact of the news in management earnings forecasts, Penman 
(1980) examines whether such forecasts convey information to the market. He finds 
evidence that firms earn excess stock returns around the forecast announcement. 
Waymire (1984) documents that good news (bad news) management forecasts are 
associated with significant positive (negative) abnormal returns in the days surrounding 
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the forecast publication. His study adds more evidence that management earnings 
forecasts provide credible and value-relevant information. 
Combining the results from the management earnings forecast literature with 
studies that show the greater pricing of reported cash flows, I expect that management 
cash flow forecasts are priced beyond total news in earnings, all else equal. My first 
hypothesis is: 
 
H1: The market pricing of the news in management cash flow forecasts is 
positive, controlling for total earnings news. 
 
This hypothesis implies that the market prices the news in management cash 
flow forecasts higher than it prices the news in accrual information. The higher pricing 
of the news in management cash flow forecasts may be greater for firms with specific 
characteristics. The value relevance of cash flows relative to accruals is expected to be 
increasing in certain firm characteristics. Specifically, I conjecture that in each of the 
four contexts discussed below, the market’s higher pricing of the news in management 
cash flow forecasts than that in accrual information is greater.  
The first attribute of the firms I examine is contemporaneous earnings news. 
Findings in prior research show that bad earnings news (e.g., losses) has a smaller 
pricing impact because the news is more transitory and firms may opt for the 
abandonment option (Basu 1997; Hayn 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Under this 
context, the market may be less concerned with accrual-based earnings and more 
interested in underlying cash flows, because cash flows is more persistent. Cash flow 
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forecasts provided by managers facilitate market participants’ assessments of firms’ 
future performance, and managers are more likely to offer guidance to signal their firm 
type.  
Consistent with the argument above, Wasley and Wu (2006) find that when 
firms have bad news in earnings, management is more likely to disclose good news in 
cash flows to mitigate bad news in earnings. DeFond and Hung (2003) also conclude 
that cash flow forecasts facilitate market participants’ assessment of firm solvency. 
Hence, I expect that the market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts to be greater for firms with contemporaneous bad news in earnings. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a. The market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is greater for firms with bad earnings news, controlling for total 
earnings news. 
 
This hypothesis suggests that the greater pricing of the news in management 
cash flow forecasts (relative to that in accrual information) increases when firms have 
contemporaneous bad news in earnings.  
Signaling future prospects or lack thereof through cash flow forecasts could also 
be employed by managers of firms in poor financial health. When firms are in poor 
financial health, investors may be more concerned with firms’ underlying cash flows, 
because the cash flow component is more persistent than is the accrual component of 
earnings (Rayburn 1986; Bowen et al. 1987). In addition, the information asymmetry 
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and the agency conflicts may be more severe for firms in poor financial health. Because 
these problems prevent investors from correctly understanding whether firms are able to 
survive financial distress, they are more likely to demand cash flow information. The 
findings in DeFond and Hung (2003) that analysts tend to forecast cash flows for firms 
with poor financial health can be viewed as a response to a higher informational 
demand of investors. Hence, financial distress presents another condition in which the 
market’s positive pricing of cash flows information will be greater than the pricing of 
accrual information. My hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H1b. The market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is greater for firms in financial distress, controlling for total 
earnings news.  
 
For growth firms, information asymmetry problems are also more severe. 
Wasley and Wu (2006) find that growth firms are more likely to issue cash flow 
forecasts in response to the greater market demand for such information. This is because 
cash flow information is relatively more value-relevant for growth firms. Kumar and 
Krishnan (2008) examine the role of growth opportunities as a determinant of the 
relative importance of operating cash flows versus accruals in firm valuation. Their 
results suggest that the value relevance of operating cash flows increases in growth 
opportunities. Furthermore, Black (1998) studies the relative value relevance of 
earnings versus cash flows of firms in different life-cycle stages. He finds that operating 
cash flows are more value-relevant than are the accruals for growth firms but not for 
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those in mature stages. In addition, growth firms are relatively small and have been in 
the capital market for a shorter period of time. They are less likely to have accumulated 
significant amount of cash. In this case, cash flow forecasts can be used by managers to 
signal the availability of their firms’ internal resources and the ability to fund profitable 
investment opportunities.  
Thus, I expect that the market’s higher pricing of the news in management cash 
flow forecasts than that of the news in accrual information to be greater for growth 
firms. This is stated in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1c. The market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is greater for growth firms, controlling for total earnings news. 
 
The market’s pricing of the news in management cash flow forecasts is also 
likely to differ across firms with different levels of value relevance of reported cash 
flows relative to that of reported accruals. This is because cash flow information may be 
intrinsically more value-relevant for certain firms and may have higher predictive 
ability for firms’ future prospects. Barth et al. (1999) demonstrate that the differential 
pricing of cash flows and accruals varies considerably across industries. Although 
reported and forecasted cash flows are likely to be correlated, it could be the case that 
management's forecasted information is too noisy or unreliable, and investors rely 
primarily on reported amounts to value the firm. In addition, investors may perceive 
certain signals from the manager's discretion in forecasting future amounts compared to 
reported amounts.  
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I expect the market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts to be greater for firms in industries with relatively higher value relevance of 
reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. My hypothesis is the following: 
 
H1d. The market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is greater as the value relevance of reported cash flows relative to 
that of reported accruals increases, controlling for total earnings news. 
 
Analyst Incorporation of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts 
Next, I examine the impact of management cash flow forecasts on financial 
analysts. These tests offer certain advantages and disadvantages compared to investor-
based tests (i.e., price reaction to cash flow news) and therefore may not necessarily 
result in the same conclusions. First, financial analysts represent a more sophisticated 
group of market participants. They have, on average, superior knowledge and more 
expertise in interpreting information contained in firms’ financial reports. Their 
forecasts of firms’ future prospects are expected to reflect more closely the information 
contained in financial information released by managers such as earnings and cash flow 
forecasts. Second, analysts’ expectations (forecast magnitude) and their differences in 
interpretations (forecast dispersion) of firms’ future prospects offer the advantages of 
being directly observable, while investors’ expectations and differences in beliefs are 
not directly observable from stock prices. Third, most would consider stock prices to be 
a noisy (although unbiased) measure of expectations. Prices are affected by a multitude 
of factors and therefore are likely much nosier than are analysts’ forecasts, which could 
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affect statistical power in small-sample studies such as mine. However, it is also the 
case that prior research provides ample evidence that analysts’ forecasts contain many 
predictable biases and exhibit herding behavior. In summary, market-based tests versus 
analyst-based tests provide trade-offs and it is unclear which provides the “better” test 
of the impact of information on market participants. Therefore, I supplement market 
reaction tests described in Hypothesis 1 with tests using analyst earnings forecasts. 
Prior research examines how corporate disclosure policy affects financial 
analysts, who are either representing or influencing the market’s expectations (Nichols 
1989; Schipper 1991). Analysts play an important role as information intermediary in 
capital markets. They help disseminate information provided by managers to the public, 
whether the information is released privately to them prior to Regulation Fair 
Disclosure or is disclosed to the public. Thus, analysts’ ability to incorporate 
management voluntary disclosure into their forecasts would have implications on the 
information environment subsequent to the disclosure. I examine whether analysts 
respond to cash flow news in the presence of earnings news by revising their earnings 
forecasts following management cash flow forecasts. If managers issue cash flow 
forecasts to move existing market expectations, analysts should incorporate new 
information and revise their expectations of firms’ future earnings accordingly. In this 
case, information asymmetry is reduced and analysts’ expectations about firms’ future 
performance are moved toward those of the managers.  
Empirically, studies investigating analyst response to management voluntary 
disclosure of earnings information date back to the 1980s. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) 
provide evidence that analysts revise their earnings forecasts in an unbiased fashion, i.e. 
17 
 
 
“good news” forecasts are associated with upward price revisions and “bad news” 
forecasts result in downward price revisions. Baginski and Hassell (1990) and Jennings 
(1984, 1987) provide evidence that analysts revise their forecasts in response to 
management earnings forecasts. Waymire (1986) finds that the accuracy of analyst 
earnings forecasts increases after management earnings forecasts. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) document that firms with more informative disclosure are associated with larger 
analyst following. More importantly, the disclosure allows analysts to reduce forecast 
error, forecast dispersion among individual analysts, and the volatility in forecast 
revisions.
2
 In addition, Call et al. (2009) conclude that analyst earnings forecasts are 
more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts. When analysts attend to 
firms’ cash flow information and explicitly forecast future cash flows, they understand 
better the firms’ future earnings. 
I expect that management cash flow forecasts, as part of the firm’s overall 
corporate disclosure policy, also affect analyst earnings forecasts. This is because when 
management issues cash flow forecasts, information asymmetry problems are mitigated 
and the uncertainty of firms’ future earnings declines. I predict that analysts revise their 
earnings forecasts following management cash flow forecasts. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that:  
 
H2: Analyst earnings forecast revisions relate positively to the news in 
management cash flow forecasts, controlling for total earnings news. 
 
                                                 
2
 Lang and Lundolm (1996) use AIMR analysts’ ratings of the overall disclosure including quarterly 
filings, press releases, and proxy statements to proxy for corporate disclosure policy. 
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 Similar to the discussions of the hypotheses regarding the market’s pricing of 
the news in management cash flow forecasts, I argue that under different contexts, the 
impact of management cash flow forecasts on analyst earnings forecasts differs cross-
sectionally as well. This is because cash flow information may be more value-relevant 
and more useful to analysts for certain firms. Ahmed et al. (2009) document that 
analysts’ interpretation of earnings news in earnings announcement varies with firm 
characteristics. 
I first distinguish good news earnings firms from bad news earnings firms. The 
argument follows that when earnings fall short of the expectations, it is more difficult 
for analysts to form subsequent expectations of firms’ future earnings. When 
management discloses cash flow information, it provides some indication of future 
earnings composition when earnings news is bad. This aids analysts in gaining a better 
understanding of the components of firms’ earnings and gives them a more complete 
picture of where firms’ earnings fall short of expectations (accruals versus cash flows). 
Analysts can then revise their forecasts in a more systematic manner, incorporating cash 
flow information. This is consistent with Call et al.’s (2009) findings that when analysts 
forecast cash flows, they adopt a more structured approach in evaluating firms’ overall 
financial position and forecast a full set of financial statements. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: The positive relation between analyst earnings forecast revisions and the 
news in management cash flow forecasts is greater for firms with bad 
earnings news, controlling for total earnings news. 
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 Analysts also may have greater difficulty in assessing future prospects for 
financially distressed firms. Similar to the argument supporting H1b, information 
asymmetry problems and agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors are more 
severe when the firm experiences financial distress. Shareholders are more concerned 
with firms’ cash flows when the firm experiences financial difficulties. Managers may 
issue cash flow forecasts to signal whether their firms have the opportunity and the 
potential to survive financial distress and to improve financial health. Management cash 
flow forecasts under this context may thus have higher perceived benefits in improving 
firms’ information environment. I contend that management cash flow forecasts affect 
analyst earnings forecasts more strongly for firms in financial distress. My hypothesis 
related to this is: 
 
H2b: The positive relation between analyst earnings forecast revisions and the 
news in management cash flow forecasts is greater for firms in financial 
distress, controlling for total earnings news. 
 
 For growth firms, information asymmetry problems may be more severe. 
Similar to the discussion supporting H1c, growth firms have significant amount of 
accruals and less accumulation of cash. As argued in Kumar and Krishnan (2008) and 
Black (1998), growth firms’ cash flows are more relevant in firm valuations because 
these firms need cash to exploit investment opportunities. Therefore, cash flow 
forecasts can be used by managers to signal the availability of their firms’ internal 
resources and the ability to fund profitable investment opportunities. I expect that 
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growth firms’ management cash flow forecasts help analysts to a larger extent in 
formulating their expectations of future earnings. Specifically, my hypothesis is the 
following: 
 
H2c: The positive relation between analyst earnings forecast revisions and the 
news in management cash flow forecasts is greater for growth firms, 
controlling for total earnings news. 
 
Similar to the discussion in H1d, analysts’ use of management cash flow 
forecasts is also likely to differ across firms with different levels of value relevance of 
reported cash flows relative to that of reported accruals. Prior studies have shown that 
the value relevance of earnings (or its components) is linked directly to the ability of 
earning (or its components) to persist into next period’s earnings (Lipe 1986). I expect 
that, as value relevance of reported cash flows relative to that of reported accruals 
increases, management cash flow forecasts aid analysts more in forecasting earnings. 
My hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2d. The positive relation between analyst earnings forecast revisions and the 
news in management cash flow forecasts is greater as the value relevance 
of reported cash flows relative to that of reported accruals increases, 
controlling for total earnings news. 
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 CHAPTER III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Testing H1 
H1 predicts that the market pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is positive, controlling for total earnings news. In other words, the market 
prices the news in management cash flow forecasts higher than it prices that in accrual 
information. To test this hypothesis, I examine the three-day cumulated abnormal stock 
returns surrounding the release of the management cash flow forecast, controlling for 
contemporaneous earnings news. I use the following model: 
 
CAR(d-1, d+1) =  α0 + β1*CF_Newsd + α1*E_Newsd + ε(d-1, d+1) (1) 
 
where CAR(d-1, d+1) represents three-day cumulated abnormal returns surrounding 
management cash flow forecasts. Subscript d refers to the day on which management 
cash flow forecast is released. CF_Newsd represents the news in management cash flow 
forecasts. It is the difference between management forecasted cash flows and the 
expected cash flows prior to the forecast. Expected cash flows are measured in two 
ways. First, I use the previous management cash flow forecast for year t before day d, if 
available. Second, when a previous management cash flow forecast of year t is not 
available, I set expected cash flows equal to reported cash flows in year t–1. I control 
for contemporaneous earnings news (E_Newsd), proxied by the difference between the 
contemporaneous management earnings forecast and expected earnings prior to day d. 
Expected earnings equal managers’ previous earnings forecast. When managers’ 
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previous forecasts are unavailable, analysts’ forecasts in the month prior to day d are 
used.  
A sample of firms with management cash flow forecasts is collected for testing 
H1. I predict a positive relation between the three-day cumulated abnormal returns and 
the news in management cash flow forecasts (β1 > 0), controlling for earnings news.  
 
Testing H1a–H1d 
H1a–H1d contend that the market’s positive pricing of the news in management 
cash flow forecasts is greater for firms with bad news in earnings, for firms in financial 
distress, for firms with greater growth opportunities, and for firms with higher value 
relevance of reported cash flows relative to that of reported accruals. In other words, the 
market’s higher pricing of the news in management cash flow forecasts than that of the 
news in accrual information is greater for firms with these characteristics. To test these 
conjectures, I modify Model (1) by adding interaction variables for these firm 
characteristics (FC). Model (1′) below shows the empirical specification: 
 
CAR(d-1, d+1) =  α0 + β1*CF_Newsd + α1*E_Newsd + γ1*FCd  
                        + β1a-1d*CF_Newsd*FCd + α1a-1d*E_Newsd*FCd + ε(d-1, d+1)  
(1′) 
 
I substitute FCd with alternative firm characteristics discussed in H1a–H1d. 
They are Bad_Earnd, Distresst–1, Growtht–1, and Ind_CFt–1 (defined below). The 
estimated β1a-1d is the key coefficient of interest in testing H1a–H1d. I expect a positive 
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relation between the three-day abnormal stock returns and the pricing of cash flow news 
for each of the FC variables (β1a-1d > 0). 
For H1a, Bad_Earnd is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
contemporaneous earnings news is negative, and equals 0 otherwise. For H1b, Distresst–
1 is financial distress, measured as Altman’s (1968) Z-score multiplied by –1 at the end 
of year t–1. A lower Z-score indicates poorer financial health. Thus, the higher the 
value of Distresst–1, the more financially distressed the firm is. For H1c, Growtht–1 is 
measured as the market-to-book ratio at the end of year t–1. Higher values of the 
market-to-book ratio represent higher firm growth. Finally, for H1d, Ind_CFt–1 
measures the value relevance of reported cash flows relative to that of reported accruals 
in year t–1. I use the following specification to estimate Ind_CF t–1: 
 
Rett–1 = ρ0 + ρ1*CFt–1 + ρ2*Accrt–1 + ρ3*CFt–2 + ρ4*Accrt–2 + φt–1 (1d) 
 
Model (1d) provides a regression of one-year buy-and-hold stock returns for 
year t–1 (Ret) on operating cash flows (CF) and accruals (Accr) in year t–1 by two-digit 
SIC code. Accr equals reported earnings minus reported operating cash flows. 
Following Ali and Zarowin (1992), I use both the level and the change to capture the 
value relevance of both transitory and permanent components of earnings. The 
coefficient on CFt–1 (ρ1) represents the summation of the valuation coefficients on the 
level and the change in cash flows in the returns-earnings framework. Similarly, the 
coefficient on Accrt–1 (ρ2) represents the summation of the valuation coefficients on the 
level and the change in accruals. The value relevance of reported cash flows relative to 
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reported accruals is defined as the difference between the estimated ρ1 and ρ2 (Ind_CFt–1 
= ρ1 − ρ2). Higher values of Ind_CFt–1 represent the relatively higher value relevance of 
reported cash flows than that of reported accruals.  
 
Testing H2 
H2 predicts that management cash flow forecasts impact analyst earnings 
forecasts. Because of reduced information asymmetry afforded by additional voluntary 
disclosures, analysts are able to formulate better expectations about the firms they 
follow. I posit that analysts revise their earnings forecast more for the news in 
management cash flow forecasts than they do for the news in accrual information. To 
test this conjecture, I adopt the following model: 
 
REV(m-1, m+1) =  α0 + β2*CF_Newsd + α2*E_Newsd + ε(m-1, m+1) (2) 
 
where REV(m-1, m+1) is the revision of analyst earnings forecasts for year t, calculated as 
the mean of analyst earnings forecasts in the month after minus that in the month before 
the management cash flow forecast, scaled by closing stock price two days (d−2) before 
the management cash flow forecast. Subscript m refers to the month in which 
management cash flow forecast is made. Other variables are as defined previously. 
According to the prediction in H2, I expect a positive relation between analyst earnings 
forecast revision and the news in management cash flow forecasts, indicating that the 
news in management cash flow forecasts provide information to analysts beyond the 
existing earnings news (β2 > 0). 
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Testing H2a–H2d 
H2a–H2d indicate that the positive relation between the news in management 
cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast revision is greater for firms with 
contemporaneous bad news in earnings, for firms in financial distress, for growth firms, 
and for firms with relatively higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of 
reported accruals. To test these conjectures, I augment Model (2) by adding interaction 
variables for firm characteristics (FC). Model (2′) below shows the empirical 
specification: 
 
REV(m-1, m+1) =  α0 + β2*CF_Newsd + α2*E_Newsd + γ2*FCd  
                         + β2a-2d*CF_Newsd*FCd + α2a-2d*E_Newsd*FCd + ε(m-1, m+1)  
(2′) 
 
All variables are as defined previously. Consistent with the arguments in H2a–
H2d, I expect greater positive relations between the news in management cash flow 
forecasts and the interaction of analyst earnings forecast revisions and each of the FC 
variables (β2a-2d > 0).     
 
Additional Tests on Analyst Earnings Forecast Properties 
H2 argues that management cash flow forecasts impact analyst earnings 
forecasts. With the improved information environment following management 
voluntary forecasts, analysts are equipped with a more complete set of information, 
which allows them to forecast firm earnings more accurately. Their differences in 
opinions about future prospects may also be smaller for firms that provide management 
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cash flow forecasts. I offer supplementary tests to examine the association between the 
issuance of management cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast error and 
forecast dispersion. The following level and change models are specified for the 
empirical investigation of this relation: 
 
|FEt| = α0 + β2.1*MCFt + ωn*Numestt + µt                   (2.1) 
Dispt = α0 + β2.1′*MCFt + ωn*Numestt + µt  (2.1′) 
Δ|FEt| = α0 + β2.2*MCFt + ωn*Numestt + µt                   (2.2) 
ΔDispt = α0 + β2.2′*MCFt + ωn*Numestt + µt  (2.2′) 
 
|FEt| is the absolute value of analyst earnings forecast error, calculated as the 
absolute value of the difference between the consensus analyst earnings forecast in the 
month following the management cash flow forecast and the actual earnings per share 
reported on I/B/E/S at the end of year t. Dispt refers to the dispersion of the consensus 
analyst earnings forecasts in the month following the management cash flow forecast.  
Δ|FEt| proxies for the change in the absolute values of analyst earnings forecast 
errors from the month before to the month after the management cash forecast for year 
t. ΔDispt represents the change in analyst earnings forecast dispersions from the month 
before to the month after the management cash forecast for year t. 
MCFt is an indicator variable that equals 1 if management issues a cash flow 
forecast during year t and equals 0 otherwise. This specification requires a matched 
sample of firms without management cash flow forecasts. Matched sample firms are 
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selected based on industry, year, and size. Numestt is the control variable indicating the 
number of analysts following the firm in year t.  
I expect a negative relation between the issuance of management cash flow 
forecasts and the levels of and the changes in analyst earnings forecast error and 
forecast dispersion (β2.1 < 0, β2.1′ < 0, β2.2 < 0, and β2.2′ < 0).   
Similar to the tests of H2a–H2d that examine the specific circumstances under 
which the analyst’s response to the news in management cash flow forecasts is greater, 
additional tests are provided to examine whether the negative relation between the 
issuance of management cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast error and 
forecast dispersion is greater (i.e., more negative) for firms with contemporaneous bad 
news in earnings, for firms in financial distress, for growth firms, and for firms with 
relatively higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. 
To test these hypotheses, I augment Models (2.1), (2.1′), (2.2), and (2.2′) by adding 
interaction variables for these firm characteristics (FC). The models are as follows: 
 
|FEt| = α0 + β2.1*MCFt + γ3*FCk,d + β2.1k*MCFt*FCk,d + ωn*Numestt + 
µt 
(2.3) 
Dispt = α0 + β2.1′*MCFt + γ3′*FCk,d + β2.1k′*MCFt*FCk,d + ωn*Numestt 
+ µt 
(2.3′) 
Δ|FEt| = α0 + β2.2*MCFt + γ3*FCk,d + β2.2k*MCFt*FCk,d + ωn*Numestt  
+ µt 
(2.4) 
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ΔDispt = α0 + β2.2′*MCFt + γ3′*FCk,d + β2.2k′*MCFt*FCk,d + ωn*Numestt 
+ µt 
(2.4′) 
 
All variables are as defined previously. Models 2.3and 2.3′ are 
potentially subject to an omitted correlated variable problem. The issuance of a 
management earnings forecast potentially reduces forecast error and dispersion 
(Waymire 1986). As shown previously, some firms concurrently issue management 
earnings forecasts at the time they issue cash flow forecasts. Therefore, it would be 
useful to include an indicator variable for whether a firm concurrently issued a 
management earnings forecast. While management earnings forecasts have been hand 
collected for my sample of firms, I do not have information on management earnings 
forecasts for the matched sample. Given that access to such information is prohibitively 
costly (purchased database or additional hand collection) and that these tests are 
supplementary, I do not include this variable in the models. I predict greater negative 
relations between the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and the interaction of 
analyst earnings forecast error and dispersion and each of the FC variables (β2.3 < 0, β2.3′ 
< 0, β2.4 < 0, and β2.4′ < 0).   
 
CHAPTER IV. DATA, SAMPLE, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Acquisition of management cash flow forecast data requires an extensive hand-
collection exercise. I read press releases appearing on the Dow Jones NewsWires and in 
The Wall Street Journal gathered by Factiva using key word searches related to 
management cash flow forecasts. Financial data and stock returns are collected from 
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Compustat Fundamentals Annual and CRSP, respectively. Analyst earnings forecasts 
are obtained from I/B/E/S Summary. For supplementary tests for H2 and H2a–H2d, 
control firms with available data from Compustat and I/B/E/S are matched with sample 
firms based on industry, year, and size.  
I search Factiva for management cash flow forecasts issued in North America 
for the period of 2004−2008. The sample selection process is detailed in Table 1. The 
initial sample of management cash flow forecasts of firms traded on U.S. stock 
exchanges consists of 1,550 firm-year observations, out of which 942 are point or range 
forecasts. The sample for testing H1 and H1a–H1d contains 775 management cash flow 
forecasts from 278 unique firms with all necessary data available from Compustat and 
CRSP. For testing H2 with analyst earnings forecast revision, the sample consists of 628 
observations, with 224 unique firms. For additional tests complementing H2 using 
analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion, the sample contains 642 management 
cash flow forecasts from 227 unique firms. The matched control sample for this test 
also consists of 642 observations but without management cash flow forecasts. For tests 
of the changes in forecast error and forecast dispersion, the sample consists of 460 
management cash flow forecasts from 185 unique firms, with a matched control sample 
of 460 observations without management cash flow forecasts. Tests of analyst forecast 
error and forecast dispersion require at least two analysts issuing forecasts for the firm. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables, with definitions listed in 
the Appendix. Panel A of Table 2 shows the distributions of variables, while Panel B 
provides correlations. The mean (median) of the three-day abnormal stock returns 
surrounding the announcement of management cash flow forecasts is 0.0027 (0.0015). 
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The mean (median) of the cash flow news in these forecasts is 0.0044 (0.0000). 
Contemporaneous earnings news has a mean (median) of 0.0033 (0.0000). For the 
sample with available analyst earnings forecast data, the mean (median) of analyst 
earnings forecast revision deflated by the stock price two days before the forecast 
announcement is 0.0000 (−0.0027). The mean (median) of the absolute value of analyst 
earnings forecast errors following management cash flow forecasts scaled by the 
absolute values of the mean consensus forecasts is 0.2679 (0.0733). The mean (median) 
of analyst earnings forecast dispersions following management cash flow forecasts 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecasts is 0.0713 (0.0253). In 
addition, the mean (median) of the change in the absolute values of analyst earnings 
forecast errors following management cash flow forecasts scaled by the absolute values 
of the mean consensus forecasts is 0.0212 (0.0028). The mean (median) of the change 
in analyst earnings forecast dispersions following management cash flow forecasts 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean consensus forecasts is 0.0069 (0.0000). 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that the Spearman (Pearson) correlation between the 
three-day abnormal stock returns and the news in management cash flow forecasts is 
0.1315 (0.1442),  significant at the 0.01 level, as expected. The Spearman (Pearson) 
correlation between the three-day abnormal stock returns and the contemporaneous 
earnings news is 0.2674 (0.1342), significant at the 0.01 level, also consistent with the 
expectation. The Spearman (Pearson) correlation between the news in management cash 
flow forecasts and contemporaneous earnings news is 0.0965 (0.1191). For the analyst 
earnings forecast revision sample, the Spearman (Pearson) correlation between analyst 
earnings forecast revision and the news in management cash flow forecasts is 0.1780 
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(0.1459), significant at the 0.01 level, as expected. The Spearman (Pearson) correlation 
between analyst earnings forecast revision and the contemporaneous earnings news is 
0.3577 (0.1821), significant at the 0.01 level, also consistent with the expectation. The 
Spearman (Pearson) correlation between the three day abnormal stock returns and 
analyst earnings forecast revision is 0.4138 (0.1944), also significant at the 0.01 level. 
These correlations indicate that the news in management cash flow forecasts could 
convey information to analysts. 
 
CHAPTER V. RESULTS 
Tests of H1 and H1a–H1d 
 H1 and H1a–H1d examine the relation between the market pricing and the news 
in management cash flow forecasts, controlling for total earnings news. H1 indicates 
that the market prices the news in management cash flow forecasts higher than it prices 
the news in accrual information. H1a–H1d hypothesize the higher pricing of the news in 
management cash flow forecasts is greater for firms with bad news in earnings, for 
firms in financial distress, for growth firms, and for firms with relatively more value-
relevant reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. I first provide individual 
tests (Table 3) and then provide a combined test (Table 5) of these firm characteristics. 
 
Test of H1 
 The first columns of results in Table 3 Panels A and B show tests of H1. Panel A 
provides results for the full sample, while Panel B provides results for a reduced 
sample. The reduced sample includes only observations that also issue a concurrent 
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management earnings forecast at the time of the management cash flow forecast. For 
these firms, tests of the differential pricing of the news in cash flow forecasts versus the 
news in accrual information are clearer. For the full sample, earnings forecast news is 
set to zero when no concurrent earnings forecast is issued, suggesting that the news in 
cash flow forecasts is accompanied by the opposite news in accrual forecasts (i.e., total 
earnings news is zero). This assumption may not hold in all settings, so I provide tests 
of both the full sample and a reduced sample to validate my conclusions. 
In Panel A, contemporaneous earnings news and the three-day abnormal stock 
returns are positively related (0.3263; t = 3.32; p < 0.01), consistent with prior literature. 
The estimated coefficient on the news in management cash flow forecasts is 0.2895 (t = 
3.83; p < 0.01), suggesting that the market prices $1.00 of cash flow news $0.29 higher 
than it prices $1.00 of accrual information. This finding provides strong support for H1.  
In Panel B, I show stronger results with the reduced sample that includes only 
observations with both management cash flow and earnings forecasts available on the 
forecast announcement day. The estimated coefficient on the news in management cash 
flow forecasts is 0.4041 (t = 4.10; p < 0.01), indicating that for $1.00 of cash flow news, 
the market prices it $0.40 higher than it prices $1.00 of accrual information. The 
estimated coefficient on the earnings news is 0.2874 (t = 2.90; p < 0.01), consistent with 
prior studies. These results again support H1 that management cash flow forecasts 
provide information to investors and that the market’s pricing of the cash flow news 
contained in management forecast is higher than that of accrual information. 
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Test of H1a 
 H1a argues that controlling for total earnings news, the market’s positive pricing 
of the news in management cash flow forecasts is greater (i.e., more positive) for firms 
with bad news in earnings. The second columns in Table 3 Panels A and B show the 
results for testing H1a. Results in Panel A suggest that, consistent with the expectation, 
for firms with contemporaneous bad earnings news, the market’s pricing of the news in 
management cash flow forecasts is significantly more positive (0.4775; t = 2.70; p < 
0.01). Specifically, the market prices $0.48 higher (lower) for $1.00 good (bad) news in 
cash flows than it prices that in accrual information when firms have contemporaneous 
bad news in earnings.  
Panel B shows similar results with the reduced sample. Consistent with H1a, the 
market’s pricing of the news in management cash flow forecasts is significantly more 
positive (0.4315; t = 2.19; p = 0.03) for firms with bad earnings news. Combined with 
the results reported in Panel A, H1a is supported in that, for firms with 
contemporaneous bad news in earnings, good (bad) news in management cash flow 
forecasts is associated with more positive (negative) market pricing in the three days 
surrounding the forecast announcement. These findings imply that while management 
cash flow forecasts communicate information to the market beyond earnings 
information in general, the impact of such forecasts on investors is greater when the 
firms release contemporaneous bad news in earnings. 
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Test of H1b 
 H1b posits that the market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash 
flow forecasts is greater (i.e., more positive) for firms in financial distress, controlling 
for total earnings news. The third columns in Table 3 Panels A and B present the results 
for testing this hypothesis. Consistent with the prediction, for firms in financial distress, 
results in Panel A shows that the market’s positive pricing of the news in management 
cash flow forecasts is significantly greater (0.1166; t = 2.66; p < 0.01). Panel B shows 
stronger results with the reduced sample. The estimated coefficient on the interaction of 
financial distress and the news in management cash flow forecasts is 0.2497 (t = 4.84; p 
< 0.01). These findings indicate that management cash flow forecasts not only affect 
investors in general in terms of their differential pricings of earnings components, but 
the impact is substantially greater for firms in financial distress. These results lend 
strong support for H1b. 
 
Test of H1c 
H1c predicts that growth firms experience greater market pricing of their cash 
flow information contained in management cash flow forecasts than that of their accrual 
information. Columns 4 in Table 3 Panels A and B report the results for testing H1c. As 
expected, results from the full sample in Panel A suggest that, controlling for total 
earnings news, the market’s positive pricing of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is significantly greater for growth firms (0.0255; t = 2.20; p = 0.03). Panel B 
shows stronger results with the reduced sample that includes only observations with 
both management cash flow and earnings forecasts available on the forecast 
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announcement day. The estimated coefficient on the news in management cash flow 
forecasts for growth firms is 0.2963 (t = 2.54; p = 0.01). These findings imply that the 
market’s higher pricing of the cash flow news in management forecasts relative to that 
of the accrual information is substantially greater for growth firms. The results lend 
credence to H1c. 
 
Test of H1d 
 H1d conjectures that controlling for total earnings news, the market’s positive 
pricing of the news in management cash flow forecasts is greater (i.e., more positive) as 
the value relevance of reported cash flows relative to that of reported accruals increases. 
Table 4 presents the relations between stock returns and earnings components, 
estimated by industry-year using all Compustat firm-years with data necessary for 
computing variables. The estimated coefficients are used in computing the value 
relevance of reported cash flows relative to reported accruals in the year prior to 
management cash flow forecasts (year t−1). Consistent with the findings in prior 
studies, year t−1 (t−2) cash flow and accrual components of earnings are positively 
(negatively) associated with year t−1 stock returns. The means of the estimated 
coefficients by industry-year on year t−1 cash flows and accruals are 1.8205 (t = 22.17; 
p < 0.01) and 1.0690 (t = 14.78; p < 0.01), respectively. The estimated coefficients on 
year t−2 cash flows and accruals are −0.6075 (t = −6.92; p < 0.01) and −0.5708 (t = 
−7.06; p < 0.01), respectively. The value relevance of reported cash flows relative to 
that of reported accruals at the end of year t−1 is the difference between the estimated 
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coefficient on year t−1 cash flows and that on year t−1 accruals for each industry-year, 
as described in Section III.  
Columns 5 in Table 3 Panels A and B present results for testing H1d. Consistent 
with the prediction, results with the full sample in Panel A show that, for firms that the 
cash flow component is more value-relevant than is the accrual component of earnings, 
the market’s positive pricing to the news in management cash flow forecasts controlling 
for total earnings news is significantly greater (0.0181; t = 3.38; p < 0.01). Panel B 
shows the coefficient of the similar magnitude with the reduced sample. The estimated 
coefficient on the interaction of industry cash flow value relevance relative to accrual 
value relevance and the news in management cash flow forecasts is 0.0194 (t = 1.84; p 
= 0.07). These results support the argument in H1d that the market’s positive pricing of 
cash flow news in management forecasts is greater as the value relevance of reported 
cash flows relative to that of reported accruals increases. 
 
Joint test of H1a–H1d 
In Table 5, I report test results from a combined model including all interactions 
of the news in management cash flow forecasts and alternative firm characteristics. The 
first column in Table 5 shows results with all observations in the full sample. H1a, H1b, 
and H1d are strongly supported. I find that controlling for total earnings news, the 
positive relation between market pricing and the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is greater for firms with contemporaneous bad news in earnings (0.5904; t = 
3.15; p < 0.01), for firms in financial distress (0.1052; t = 2.22; p = 0.03), and for firms 
with relatively higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported 
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accruals (0.0148; t = 2.80; p < 0.01). As shown in the first column, the coefficient on 
the interaction of growth firm indicator and the news in management cash flow 
forecasts is positive, but is not significant at conventional levels (0.0889; t = 0.85; p = 
0.39). The second column in Table 5 contains results for the reduced sample using only 
observations with concurrent management earnings forecasts available. These results 
lead to similar conclusions, except for H1d, where the coefficient is positive (0.0135) 
and is marginally significant using a one-tailed test (t = 1.29; p = 0.20).  
To summarize, I find evidence that the market prices cash flow information in 
management cash flow forecasts more than it prices accrual information, supporting H1. 
Furthermore, controlling for total earnings news, the positive relation between the 
market pricing and the news in management cash flow forecasts is greater for firms with 
contemporaneous bad news in earnings, for firms in financial distress, and for firms 
with relatively higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported 
accruals. Results also show some support for H1c for growth firms. 
 
Tests of H2 and H2a–H2d 
As discussed in Section II, prior research concludes that corporate disclosure 
policy affects financial analysts. When managers issue cash flow forecasts, information 
asymmetry is reduced and analysts are able to converge their expectations toward those 
of the managers and forecast earnings more accurately. H2 and H2a–H2d examine the 
relation between management cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast 
revision, controlling for total earnings news. Specifically, I expect that analysts revise 
their earnings forecasts more for the news in management cash flow forecasts than for 
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the news in accrual information. Additionally, H2a–H2d argue that the impact on 
analyst earnings forecast revisions is greater for firms with contemporaneous bad news 
in earnings, for firms in financial distress, for growth firms, and for firms with relatively 
higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. I first 
provide results in Table 6 (Panels A and B) from individual tests of firm characteristics. 
I then show results in Table 7 from a combined test.  
 
Test of H2 
H2 predicts that analyst earnings forecast revisions relate positively to the news 
in management cash flow forecasts, controlling for total earnings news. In other words, 
analysts revise their earnings forecasts more positively (negatively) for the good (bad) 
news in management cash flow forecasts than for the news in accrual information.  
The first columns in Table 6 Panels A and B show the results for testing H2. In 
Panel A, contemporaneous earnings news and analyst earnings forecast revision are 
positively related (0.0982; t = 4.08; p < 0.01), consistent with prior literature. The 
estimated coefficient on the news in management cash flow forecasts is 0.0526 (t = 
2.98; p < 0.01), suggesting that analysts revise their earnings forecast $0.05 more 
upwardly (downwardly) for $1.00 good (bad) news management cash flow forecast than 
for the news in accrual information. This finding lends credence for H2.  
In Panel B, I show stronger results with the reduced sample that includes only 
observations with both management cash flow and earnings forecasts available on the 
forecast announcement day. The estimated coefficient on the news in management cash 
flow forecasts is 0.1141 (t = 5.83; p < 0.01) and the estimated coefficient on the 
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earnings news is 0.0794 (t = 3.64; p < 0.01). These results again support H2 that 
analysts revise their earnings forecasts $0.11 more for $1.00 news in management cash 
flow forecasts than for that in accrual information.  
Similar to the conclusions in H1 that management cash flow forecasts affect 
investors, these forecasts also have an influence on analysts. Analysts respond to the 
news of cash flows contained in these forecasts beyond the existing earnings news by 
revising their earnings forecasts differently for cash flow and for accrual information. 
 
Test of H2a 
H2a posits that the positive relation between the news in management cash flow 
forecasts and analyst earnings forecast revision is greater (i.e., more positive) for firms 
with bad news in earnings. Columns 2 of Panels A and B in Table 6 report test results 
that support this argument. In Panel A, the estimated coefficient on the cash flow news 
is 0.1818 (t = 4.80; p < 0.01). This indicates that for firms that provide management 
cash flow forecasts, analysts revise their earnings forecast $0.18 more positively 
(negatively) for $1.00 good (bad) news in cash flows than they do for that in accruals 
when the firms have contemporaneous bad news in earnings. This finding provides 
strong support for H2. In Panel B, I show similar results with the smaller sample that 
includes only observations with both management cash flow and earnings forecasts 
available on the forecast announcement day. The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction of the indicator variable for bad earnings news and the news in management 
cash flow forecasts is 0.1247 (t = 3.39; p < 0.01). These results together lead to the 
conclusion that that controlling for total news in earnings, the positive relation between 
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analyst earnings forecast revision and the news in management cash flow forecasts is 
greater for firms with contemporaneous bad news in earnings. H2a is supported. 
 
Test of H2b 
H2b predicts that the positive relation between the news in management cash 
flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast revision is greater (i.e., more positive) for 
firms in financial distress, controlling for total earnings news. Results from testing this 
hypothesis are presented in columns 3 of Panels A and B in Table 6. I do not find 
results supportive of H2b. 
 
Test of H2c 
H2c posits the positive relation between the news in management cash flow 
forecasts and analyst earnings forecast revision is greater (i.e., more positive) for 
growth firms, controlling for total earnings news. Results for testing this hypothesis are 
presented in columns 4 of Panels A and B in Tables 6. I do not find a greater positive 
relation as argued in H2c.  
 
Test of H2d 
H2d conjectures that controlling for total news in earnings, the positive relation 
between the news in management cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast 
revision is greater (i.e., more positive) as the value relevance of reported cash flows 
relative to that of reported accruals increases. I find results consistent with the 
prediction in H2d using the full sample (as shown in column 4 of Panel A in Table 6). 
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The estimated coefficient on the interaction of the news in management cash flow 
forecasts and the relative cash flow value relevance is 0.0034 (t = 1.64; p = 0.10). This 
suggests that for firms with relatively higher value relevance of reported cash flows 
than that of reported accruals, the revision in analyst earnings forecasts associated with 
news in management cash flow news is greater than that associated with the news in 
accrual information. Using the reduced sample with both management cash flow and 
earnings forecast available, the coefficient on the interaction of the news in 
management cash flow forecasts and industry cash flow value relevance is positive, but 
is not significant at conventional levels (0.0035; t = 1.18; p = 0.24).  
 
Joint test of H2a–H2d 
I report test results in Table 7 from a combined model including all interactions 
of the news in management cash flow forecasts and alternative firm characteristics. I 
present test results using the full sample in the first column and the reduced sample in 
the second column. Results again lend credence to H2a and H2d. For firms with 
contemporaneous bad news in earnings, analysts’ revision of earnings forecasts 
following management cash flow forecasts are significantly greater (0.1617; t = 5.18; p 
< 0.01), controlling for total earnings news. For firms with relatively higher value 
relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals, the positive relation 
between the news in management cash flow forecast and analyst earnings forecast 
revision is greater (0.0040; t = 2.57; p < 0.01). Tests using the reduced sample lead to 
similar conclusions, except for H2d, where the coefficient is positive (0.0035) and 
marginally significant using a one-tailed test (t = 1.34; p = 0.18).  
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To summarize, test results imply that management cash flow forecasts affect 
financial analysts. Analysts respond to cash flow information contained in management 
cash flow forecasts, controlling for total earnings news. In particular, they revise their 
earnings forecasts more positively (negatively) for the good (bad) news in management 
cash flow forecasts than for the news in accrual information. Furthermore, the positive 
relation between the news in management cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings 
forecast revisions is greater for firms with contemporaneous bad news in earnings, and 
for firms that reported cash flow component is more value-relevant than is reported 
accrual component of earnings. These conclusions identify cases in which management 
cash flow forecasts have greater impact on analysts. 
 
Additional Tests of H2 and H2a–H2d 
Additional tests related to H2 and H2a–H2d examine the relation between 
management cash flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast properties. Specifically, 
analyst earnings forecast error and forecast dispersion are expected to be negatively 
related to the issuance of management cash flow forecasts. The negative relation is 
predicted to be greater (i.e., more negative) for firms with contemporaneous bad news 
in earnings, for firms in financial distress, for growth firms, and for firms with relatively 
higher value relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. Results 
from individual tests are listed in Tables 8–11. In Table 8 (9), I present results from the 
tests that investigate the relation between the issuance of management cash flow 
forecasts and analyst earnings forecast error (dispersion) in the month following 
43 
 
 
management cash flow forecasts. Tables 10 and 11 display results of this relation using 
the change models. Finally, in Table 12, I report results using combined models. 
  
Additional Test Corresponding to H2 
As discussed in Section II, prior research concludes that corporate disclosure 
policy affects financial analysts. When managers issue cash flow forecasts, information 
asymmetry may be reduced and analysts are able to form more homogeneous 
expectations and forecast earnings more accurately. Thus, I contend that analyst 
earnings forecast error and forecast dispersion are smaller following management cash 
flow forecasts.  
Using the level models (i.e., analyst earnings forecast error and dispersion in the 
month following the management cash flow forecast) the coefficient on the MCF 
indicator variable is −0.1057 (t = −2.56; p < 0.01) for forecast error (as shown in the 
first column of Table 8) and −0.0176 (t = −2.17; p = 0.01) for forecast dispersion (as 
shown in the first column of Table 9). These results suggest that the existence of a 
management cash flow forecast is associated with lower forecast error and dispersion, 
consistent with my argument. Using the change models (i.e., the changes in analyst 
earnings forecast error and dispersion from the month before and to the month after the 
management cash flow forecast), the coefficient on MCF is −0.0058 (t = −1.72; p = 
0.08) for forecast error (as shown in the first column of Table 10) and −0.0026 (t = 
−2.03; p = 0.04) for forecast dispersion (as shown in the first column of Table 11). This 
is also consistent with the notion that management cash flow forecasts help analysts to 
forecast earnings more accurately with lower dispersion among individual analysts. The 
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results from both the level and the change models provide support that analyst earnings 
forecast error and forecast dispersion are significantly smaller for firms whose 
managers provide cash flow forecasts. Next, I test first individually (Tables 8–11) and 
then in a combined model (Table 12) for greater impact of the issuance of management 
cash flow forecasts on analysts who follow firms with certain characteristics, i.e., bad 
earnings news, financial distress, firm growth, and relative value relevance of reported 
cash flows.  
 
Additional Test Corresponding to H2a–H2d 
I posit that the negative relation between the issuance of management cash flow 
forecasts and analyst earnings forecast error and forecast dispersion is greater for firms 
with bad news in earnings, for financially distressed firms, for growth firms, and for 
firms with more value-relevant reported cash flows than reported accruals. Columns 2–
5 in Tables 8 and 9 report results using the level models. Results in columns 5 indicate 
that the negative relations between the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and 
analyst forecast error (−0.0077; t = −2.61; p < 0.01) and forecast dispersion (−0.0017; t 
= −2.79; p < 0.01) are greater (i.e., more negative) for firms with relatively higher value 
relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals. From these individual 
tests, I do not find consistent evidence that analysts forecast earnings better for firms 
with bad earnings news, in financial distress, or with more value-relevant reported cash 
flows than reported accruals, and whose managers provide cash flow forecasts. 
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Additional joint test Corresponding to H2a–H2d 
I report test results in Table 12 from a combined model including all interactions 
of the news in management cash flow forecasts and alternative firm characteristics. The 
results confirm the conjecture that for firms that reported cash flows are more value-
relevant than reported accruals, the negative relation between the issuance of 
management cash flow forecast and analyst earnings forecast error (−0.0067; t = 1.81; p 
= 0.07) and forecast dispersion (−0.0018; t = −2.85; p < 0.01) is significantly greater, 
supported by the tests using level models. Test results from change models also show 
evidence for the greater negative relation between the issuance of management cash 
flow forecasts and analyst earnings forecast error (−0.0168; t = −3.86; p < 0.01) as the 
value relevance of reported cash flows relative to reported accruals increases.  
In summary, additional tests suggest that management cash flow forecasts affect 
analyst earnings forecast properties. I document that analyst earnings forecast error and 
forecast dispersion are smaller for firms whose managers issue cash flow forecasts. In 
addition, some evidence exists that the effect is greater as the value relevance of 
reported cash flows relative to reported accruals increases. 
Together with the results from analyst earning forecast revision tests, I provide 
evidence that management cash flow forecasts affect analysts. In general, analysts 
respond to management cash flow forecasts by revising their earnings forecasts. 
Analysts are also able to forecast earnings more accurately with smaller dispersion 
among individual analysts. Test results also lend some support that the degree of impact 
varies cross-sectionally based upon firm characteristics.  
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 I investigate voluntary disclosure in the area of management cash flow forecasts. 
Prior research focuses on management earnings forecasts and provides evidence that 
these voluntary forecasts affect the market’s expectations and analysts’ interpretations 
of firms’ future prospects. However, to date, Wasley and Wu (2006) and Cao et al. 
(2009) are the only two studies that systematically examine management voluntary cash 
flow forecasts. Wasley and Wu (2006) study the ex ante determinants of management 
cash flow forecasts. Cao et al. (2009) use a subsample of Wasley and Wu (2006) and 
examine the incentives that lead managers to issue the less credible “soft-talk” cash 
flow forecasts that have ex post low verifiability. 
My study differs from theirs in that I investigate the ex post impact of 
management cash flow forecasts on investors’ differential pricing of cash flow and 
accrual information and on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, I first test for how 
the market prices the news contained in management cash flow forecasts differently 
than it prices the news in accrual information. I predict and find a positive relation 
between the market’s pricing and the news in management cash flow forecasts, 
controlling for total earnings news. I then distinguish sample firms according to their 
distinct characteristics and find that the market’s positive pricing of the news in 
management cash flow forecasts is greater (i.e., more positive) for firms with 
contemporaneous bad news in earnings, for firms in financial distress, for growth firms, 
and for firms with higher value-relevant reported cash flows than that of reported 
accruals.  
47 
 
 
Secondly, I study the impact of management cash flow forecasts on analyst 
earnings forecasts. I examine whether analysts respond to the news in management cash 
flow forecasts, in the presence of total earnings news. Results support my hypothesis 
that analysts revise their earnings forecast more positively (negatively) to the good 
(bad) news in cash flow forecasts than to the news in accrual information. In addition, 
the positive relation between analyst earnings forecast revision and the news in 
management cash flow forecasts is greater for firms with bad news in earnings, and for 
firms with higher value relevance of reported cash flows relative to that of reported 
accruals.  
Finally, I offer additional tests that examine whether the issuance of 
management cash flow forecasts affect analyst earnings forecast properties, i.e., forecast 
error and forecast dispersion. I find evidence that forecast error and dispersion are 
smaller for firms whose managers issue cash flow forecasts than for a matched sample 
of firms whose managers do not. I further investigate whether the impact differs among 
firms based on their characteristics. The results show some evidence that the relation 
between the issuance of management cash flow forecast and analyst earnings forecast 
error and forecast dispersion is more negative for firms with relatively higher value 
relevance of reported cash flows than that of reported accruals.  
My study benefits investors (analysts) by facilitating their understanding of the 
circumstances under which analysts (investors) view management cash flow forecasts 
as informative. It also benefits managers in that empirical results shed light on the 
impact of their voluntary cash flow forecasts on capital market participants. They may 
learn about whether their forecasts have had the intended effects. In addition, my study 
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potentially informs auditors. Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in 
analyst and management cash flow forecasts. Auditors may be aware of such forecasts 
and are interested in the impact of these forecasts on the market because they are held 
responsible to review any information disclosed by the managers in the documents that 
accompany audited financial statements. In many cases, management cash flow 
forecasts are issued in conjunction with the release of audited financial statement. 
Finally, my study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by documenting how 
market participants respond to management cash flow forecasts. I find that these 
forecasts provide information to market participants (investors and analysts) beyond the 
existing earnings information. My findings also indicate that analysts forecast earnings 
better when management issues cash flow forecasts, as indicated by lower forecast error 
and lower forecast dispersion.  
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APPENDIX 
 Variable Definitions with Corresponding Compustat Data Item Mnemonics 
 
Variable  Definition 
CAR(d-1, d+1)  Three-day cumulated abnormal stock returns surrounding management 
cash flow forecast announcements. Subscript d refers to the day on 
which management cash flow forecast is released. Abnormal stock 
returns are raw returns minus value-weighted market index. 
REV(m-1, m+1)  The revision of analyst earnings forecasts for year t, calculated as the 
mean of analyst earnings forecasts in the month after minus that in the 
month before the management cash flow forecast, scaled by closing 
stock price two days (d−2) before the management cash flow forecast. 
Subscript m refers to the month in which management cash flow 
forecast is issued. 
CF_Newsd  The news in management cash flow forecasts, measured as the 
difference between management forecasted cash flows on day d and 
the expected cash flows prior to the current forecast, scaled by stock 
closing price on day d−2. Expected cash flows are measured as either 
the cash flows forecasted by the management prior to day d or 
reported cash flows of year t−2.  
E_Newsd  Contemporaneous earnings news. It is calculated as the earnings 
forecasted by the management on day d minus the expected earnings, 
scaled by closing stock price on day d−2. Expected earnings are 
measured as the earnings forecasted by either the management or 
analysts before day d. 
|FEt|  The absolute value of analyst earnings forecast error for year t, scaled 
by the absolute value of the mean of analyst forecasts of earnings per 
share in month m–1. Analyst earnings forecast error is the difference 
between the mean of analyst earnings forecasts following the 
management cash flow forecast and the actual earnings per share 
reported on I/B/E/S.   
Dispt  Analyst earnings forecast dispersion for year t, measured as the 
standard deviation of the consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings per 
share following the management cash flow forecast, scaled by the 
absolute value of the mean of analyst earnings forecasts in month 
m−1.   
Δ|FEt|  The change in the absolute values of analyst earnings forecast errors 
from the month before to after the management cash forecast for year 
t.  
ΔDispt  The change in analyst earnings forecast dispersions from the month 
before to the month after the management cash forecast for year t. 
MCFt  Indicator variable that equals 1 if the management issues a cash flow 
forecast in year t; 0 otherwise. 
NumEstt  The number of analysts following the firm in year t. 
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED) 
 Variable Definitions with Corresponding Compustat Data Item Mnemonics 
 
Variable  Definition 
Bad_Earnd  Indicator variable that equals 1 if E_Newsd < 0; 0 otherwise. 
Distresst–1  Financial distress at the end of year t−1, measured as Altman’s Z-
score (Zt−1) multiplied by –1. Altman’s Z-score is obtained from the 
following model: 
Zt−1 = 1.2WCAPt−1 + 1.4REt−1 + 3.3EBITt−1 + 0.999SALEt−1 + 
0.6MVEt−1,  
where WCAP is working capital (WCAP) scaled by total assets (AT), 
RE is retained earnings (RE) scaled by total assets, EBIT is earnings 
before interest and taxes scaled (EBIT) by total assets, SALE is sales 
scaled by total assets, and MVE is market value of equity (MV) 
divided by total liabilities. MV is calculated as the stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year (PRCC_F) multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding (CSHO). Total liabilities are calculated as total 
shareholders’ equity (SEQ) minus total assets.  
Growtht–1  Firm growth, measured as the market-to-book ratio at the end of year 
t−1. Market-to-book ratio is MV divided by the book value of equity 
(CEQ).  
Ind_CFt–1  The importance of the cash flow component relative to the accrual 
component of earnings for the industry for year t–1. It is equal to ρ1 
less ρ2,which are estimated by industry-year from the model below: 
 
Rett−1 = ρ0 + ρ1*CFt−1 + ρ2*Accrt−1 + ρ3*CFt−2 + ρ4*Accrt−2+ φt−1. 
 
Rett–1 refers to one-year buy-and-hold stock returns for year t−1, 
calculated as MVt−1 minus MVt−2 plus dividends (DVC) in year t−1, 
and divided by MVt−1.  
CFt−1 refers to net cash flows from operating activities (OANCF) for 
year t−1. Accrt−1 is accruals, measured as the difference between 
income before extraordinary items (IB) for year t−1 and CFt−1. 
Earnings variables are scaled by MVt−2. The model is estimated by 
industry-year with all firm-year observations available on Compustat. 
Variables in the model with values greater than 1.5 are eliminated. 
Industry classification is based on the first two digits of the SIC 
codes.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
  
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
Management cash flow forecasts issued by firms traded on U.S. stock 
exchanges from 2004 to 2008  1,550  
 
No point or range forecasts  (608)  
 
No Compustat or CRSP data  (68)  
 
Extreme CF_Newsd 
a
  (99)  
 
Sample for testing H1  775  
 
No I/B/E/S data for calculating REV(m-1, m+1)  (147)  
    
Sample for testing H2  628  
__________________________ 
a
Observations in the 5 percent extreme tails of the distributions of CF_Newsd are 
eliminated. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 2 
 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A. Distributions 
 
Variable  N 
 
Mean  Median  
Standard 
Deviation  25%  75% 
CAR(d-1, d+1)  775  0.0027  0.0015  0.0685  −0.0265  0.0340 
REV(m-1, m+1)  628  0.0000  −0.0027  0.0142  −0.0018  0.0014 
CF_Newsd  775  0.0044  0.0000  0.0325  −0.0030  0.0096 
E_Newsd  775  0.0033  0.0000  0.0246  0.0000  0.0022 
Bad_Newsd  775  0.1817  0.0000  0.3859  0.0000  0.0000 
Distresst–1  728  0.3041  −0.3229  2.4360  −0.8038  0.3160 
Growtht–1  765  4.4349  2.4478  8.9488  1.7969  4.0975 
Ind_CFt–1  769  0.0792  0.1097  3.6719  −0.0434  0.3782 
|FEt|  642  0.2679  0.0733  0.7393  0.0231  0.2490 
Dispt  642  0.0713  0.0253  0.1452  0.0126  0.0678 
Δ|FEt|  460  0.0212  0.0028  0.0510  0.0000  0.0253 
ΔDispt  460  0.0069  0.0000  0.0197  0.0000  0.0087 
_______________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. 
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED) 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel B. Correlations 
 
 CAR(d−1, d+1) REV(m−1,m+1) CF_Newsd E_Newsd Bad_Newsd Distresst−1 Growtht−1 Ind_CFt−1 |FEt| Dispt Δ|FEt| ΔDispt 
CAR(d−1, d+1) 1 0.1944 0.1442 0.1342 −0.1830 0.0900 −0.0949 −0.0033 0.0374 0.0225 −0.0684 0.0850 
REV(m−1,m+1) 0.4138 1 0.1459 0.1821 −0.1627 0.0678 0.0862 0.0654 −0.1788 −0.1848 0.4452 0.0733 
CF_Newsd 0.1315 0.1780 1 0.1191 −0.1170 0.0158 −0.0217 0.0209 0.0768 −0.0907 −0.0631 −0.0177 
E_Newsd 0.2674 0.3577 0.0965 1 −0.3594 −0.0335 −0.1039 0.0247 −0.0080 0.0115 −0.0262 0.0085 
Bad_Newsd −0.1728 −0.2306 −0.1217 −0.6931 1 −0.0226 0.0433 −0.0225 −0.0536 −0.1339 0.1462 0.0005 
Distresst−1 0.0268 0.0700 0.0294 0.0417 −0.0925 1 0.2317 0.0451 −0.1259 −0.0019 0.1103 −0.0133 
Growtht−1 −0.0552 0.0439 0.0508 0.0271 0.0282 0.2377 1 0.0318 −0.0246 −0.0692 −0.0006 −0.1473 
Ind_CFt−1 0.0018 0.0258 −0.0084 −0.0252 −0.0073 0.0145 −0.0468 1 −0.0285 −0.2372 0.0086 −0.0306 
|FEt| 0.0399 −0.0260 0.0363 −0.0027 0.0455 −0.1626 −0.1871 0.0566 1 0.0529 0.6070 −0.2012 
Dispt −0.0501 −0.0053 0.0090 −0.0287 0.0075 0.0546 −0.3099 0.0903 0.2040 1 0.6454 0.4255 
Δ|FEt| −0.0531 0.1200 −0.0805 −0.0781 0.0787 0.0428 −0.1290 0.0575 0.3816 0.3194 1 −0.2087 
ΔDispt 0.0159 0.0835 −0.0242 0.0413 −0.0125 −0.0472 −0.1775 0.0895 0.1128 0.3336 0.1763 1 
__________________________  
See Appendix for variable definitions. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are below (above) the diagonal. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 
percentile unless noted otherwise. Amounts in bold are significant at the 0.01 level. 
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TABLE 3 
Market Pricing of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts: 
Dependent Variable = CAR(d-1, d+1) 
 
Panel A. Full Sample  
 
   Firm Characteristics (FC) 
 
 (H1)  
Bad_Earnd 
(H1a)  
Distresst−1 
(H1b)  
Growtht−1 
(H1c)  
Ind_CFt−1 
(H1d) 
Intercept 0.0002 
(0.07) 
 0.0056 
(1.96)** 
 0.0001 
(0.04) 
 0.0031 
(1.11) 
 0.0004 
(0.17) 
CF_Newsd 0.2895 
(3.83)*** 
 0.1588 
(1.85)* 
 0.2590 
(3.26)*** 
 0.2056 
(2.47)*** 
 0.2892 
(3.85)*** 
E_Newsd 0.3263 
(3.32)*** 
 0.2550                        
(2.18)* 
0.3684 
(3.35)*** 
 0.2620 
(2.44)*** 
 0.3613 
(3.44)*** 
 
CF_Newsd*FC   0.4775 
(2.70)*** 
 0.1166 
(2.66)*** 
 0.0255 
(2.20)** 
 0.0181 
(3.38)*** 
E_Newsd*FC   −0.3794 
(−1.50) 
 −0.0312 
(−0.55) 
 0.0248 
(1.48) 
 −0.0417 
(−1.01) 
FC   −0.0290 
(−4.07)*** 
 0.0018 
(1.69)* 
 −0.0006 
(−1.98)** 
 0.0002 
(1.28) 
R
2
 3.39%  5.83%  4.64%  3.82%  4.39% 
N 775  775  728  765  769 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics 
in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a 
two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 3 
Market Pricing of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts: 
Dependent Variable = CAR(d-1, d+1) 
 
Panel B. Reduced Sample with Concurrent E_Newsd 
 
   Firm Characteristics (FC) 
 
 (H1)  
Bad_Earnd 
(H1a)  
Distresst−1 
(H1b)  
Growtht−1 
(H1c)  
Ind_CFt−1 
(H1d) 
Intercept 0.0036 
(0.07) 
 0.0142 
(3.90)*** 
 0.0039 
(1.32) 
 0.0179 
(3.43)*** 
 0.0032 
(1.09) 
CF_Newsd 0.4041 
(4.10)*** 
 0.2049 
(1.64)* 
 0.4187 
(4.16)*** 
 0.1445 
(1.05) 
 0.4285 
(4.36)*** 
E_Newsd 0.2874 
(2.90)*** 
 0.1329                      
(1.11) 
0.2872 
(2.63)*** 
 0.1834 
(1.47) 
 0.3192 
(3.03)*** 
 
CF_Newsd*FC   0.4315 
(2.19)** 
 0.2497 
(4.84)*** 
 0.2963 
(2.54)*** 
 0.0194 
(1.84)* 
E_Newsd*FC   −0.2572 
(−1.02) 
 −0.1064 
(−1.85)* 
 0.1506 
(1.22) 
 −0.0379 
(−0.93) 
FC   −0.0376 
(−5.07)*** 
 0.0026 
(2.10)** 
 −0.0123 
(−3.91)*** 
 −0.0001 
(−0.15) 
R
2
    4.97%  9.58%  10.25%  7.17%  7.38% 
N 536  536  507  523  531 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics 
in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a 
two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 4 
Regression of Stock Returns on Current and Lagged Operating Cash flows and 
Accruals, Estimated by Industry-Year: 
Dependent Variable = Rett-1 
 
N  
  Independent Variables 
R
2
  CFt–1  Accrt–1  CFt–2  Accrt–2 
476  35.64%  1.8205 
(22.17)*** 
 1.0690 
(14.78)*** 
 –0.6075 
(–6.92)*** 
 –0.5708 
(–7.06)*** 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. Amounts reported are the means of regression coefficients 
estimated by industry-year (with t-statistics in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 5 
Market Pricing of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts: 
Dependent Variable = CAR(d−1, d+1) 
 
 Full Sample  Sample with Concurrent E_Newsd 
Intercept 0.0179 
(3.78)*** 
 0.0278 
(4.89)*** 
CF_Newsd 0.0411 
(0.32) 
 0.0721 
(0.46) 
E_Newsd 0.2184 
(1.46) 
 0.0632 
(0.42) 
CF_Newsd*Bad_Earnd (H1a) 0.5904 
(3.15)*** 
 0.5293 
(2.49)*** 
E_Newsd*Bad_Earnd −0.6647 
(−2.10)** 
 −0.3121 
(−1.00) 
CF_Newsd*Distresst−1 (H1b) 0.1052 
(2.22)** 
 0.2149 
(3.97)*** 
E_Newsd*Distresst−1 0.0125 
(0.21) 
 −0.0598 
(−0.98) 
CF_Newsd*Growtht−1 (H1c) 0.0889 
(0.85) 
 0.1478 
(1.24) 
E_Newsd*Growtht−1 0.2014 
(1.59) 
 0.1251 
(1.00) 
CF_Newsd*Ind_CFt−1 (H1d) 0.0148 
(2.80)*** 
 0.0135 
(1.29) 
E_Newsd*Ind_CFt−1 −0.0053 
(−0.07) 
 −0.0037 
(−0.05) 
Bad_Earnd  −0.0248 
(−3.35)*** 
 −0.0322 
(−4.30)*** 
Distresst−1 0.0026 
(2.30)** 
 0.0035 
(2.71)*** 
Growtht−1  −0.0125 
(−3.57)*** 
 −0.0136 
(−3.48)*** 
Ind_CFt−1  0.0002 
(1.36) 
 −0.0001 
(−0.19) 
R
2
 9.69%  17.78% 
N 717  501 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics 
in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a 
two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 6 
Analyst Incorporation of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts: 
Dependent Variable = REV(m-1, m+1) 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
 
   Firm Characteristics (FC) 
 
 (H2)  
Bad_Earnd 
(H2a)  
Distresst−1 
(H2b)  
Growtht−1 
(H2c)  
Ind_CFt−1 
(H2d) 
Intercept −0.0032 
(−5.76)*** 
 −0.0016 
(−2.47)*** 
 −0.0025 
(−5.20)*** 
 −0.0045 
(−4.66)*** 
 −0.0032 
(−5.64)*** 
CF_Newsd 0.0526 
(2.98)*** 
 −0.0031 
(−0.16) 
 0.0672 
(4.41)*** 
 0.0639 
(2.45)*** 
 0.0584 
(3.30)*** 
E_Newsd 0.0982 
(4.08)*** 
 0.0035 
(0.13) 
 0.0799 
(3.83)*** 
 0.0285 
(1.02) 
 0.1012 
(4.10)*** 
CF_Newsd*FC   0.1818 
(4.80)*** 
 −0.0110 
(−1.33) 
 −0.0054 
(−0.25) 
 0.0034 
(1.64)* 
E_Newsd*FC   −0.0010 
(−0.67) 
 0.0042 
(0.41) 
 0.0888 
(3.55)*** 
 −0.0148 
(−0.92) 
FC   0.3111 
(5.39)*** 
 0.0004 
(1.95)* 
 0.0013 
(1.90)* 
 0.0002 
(3.31)*** 
R
2
 4.37%  13.51%  6.41%  6.59%  6.22% 
N 628  628  601  615  627 
          
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics in 
parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a two-
tailed test. 
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TABLE 6 
Analyst Incorporation of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts: 
Dependent Variable = REV(m-1, m+1) 
 
Panel B. Reduced Sample with Concurrent E_Newsd 
 
   Firm Characteristics (FC) 
 
 (H2)  
Bad_Earnd 
(H2a)  
Distresst−1 
(H2b)  
Growtht−1 
(H2c)  
Ind_CFt−1 
(H2d) 
Intercept −0.0027 
(−4.71) 
 −0.0001 
(−0.12) 
 −0.0025 
(−4.31)*** 
 −0.0028 
(−2.78)*** 
 −0.0027 
(−4.69)*** 
CF_Newsd 0.1141 
(5.83)*** 
 0.0540 
(2.27)*** 
 0.1179 
(6.11)*** 
 0.1079 
(4.09)*** 
 0.1186 
(5.97)*** 
E_Newsd 0.0794 
(3.64)*** 
 −0.0321 
(−1.28) 
 0.0686 
(3.14)*** 
 0.0048 
(0.19) 
 0.0868 
(3.84)*** 
CF_Newsd*FC   0.1247 
(3.39)*** 
 −0.0158 
(−1.54) 
 −0.0077 
(−0.35) 
 0.0035 
(1.18) 
E_Newsd*FC   −0.0025 
(−1.82)* 
 0.0039 
(0.34) 
 0.0991 
(4.33)*** 
 −0.0226 
(−1.47) 
FC   0.3467 
(6.83)*** 
 0.0004 
(1.57) 
 0.0003 
(0.39) 
 −0.0000 
(−0.13) 
R
2
 10.87%  23.89%  11.32%  12.50%  10.79% 
N 470  470  453  462  469 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics 
in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a 
two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 7 
Analyst Incorporation of the News in Management Cash Flow Forecasts: 
Dependent Variable = REV(m-1, m+1) 
 
 Full Sample  Sample with Concurrent E_Newsd 
Intercept −0.0008 
(−0.91) 
 0.0003 
(0.34) 
CF_Newsd 0.0493 
(2.13)** 
 0.0655 
(2.35)** 
E_Newsd −0.0513 
(−1.98)* 
 −0.0687 
(−2.48)*** 
CF_Newsd*Bad_Earnd (H2a) 0.1617 
(5.18)*** 
 0.1242 
(3.36)*** 
E_Newsd*Bad_Earnd 0.2406 
(4.41)*** 
 0.2422 
(4.18)*** 
CF_Newsd*Distresst−1 (H2b) −0.0012 
(−0.14) 
 0.0041 
(0.40) 
E_Newsd*Distresst−1 −0.0093 
(−0.91) 
 −0.0112 
(−1.00) 
CF_Newsd*Growtht−1 (H2c) −0.0136 
(−0.75) 
 −0.0139 
(−0.66) 
E_Newsd*Growtht−1 0.0748 
(3.57)*** 
 0.0759 
(3.42)*** 
CF_Newsd*Ind_CFt−1 (H2d) 0.0040 
(2.57)*** 
 0.0035 
(1.34) 
E_Newsd*Ind_CFt−1 −0.0194 
(−1.39) 
 −0.0171 
(−1.12) 
Bad_Earnd  −0.0015 
(−1.20) 
 −0.0017 
(−1.34) 
Distresst−1 0.0003 
(1.41) 
 0.0004 
(1.49) 
Growtht−1  0.0000 
(0.04) 
 −0.0006 
(−0.86) 
Ind_CFt−1  0.0002 
(5.12)*** 
 0.0001 
(0.94) 
R
2
 23.04%  20.99% 
N 591  448 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise.  Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics 
in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a 
two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 8 
The Impact of Management Cash Flow Forecasts on  
Analyst Earnings Forecast Error: 
Dependent Variable = |FEt| 
 
 
  Firm Characteristics (FC) 
Full Sample Bad_Earnd  Distresst−1  Growtht−1  Ind_CFt−1 
Intercept 0.3314      
(7.59)*** 
0.3361 
(6.08)*** 
   0.3195 
(7.00)*** 
 0.3928 
(6.24)*** 
 0.3182 
(7.50)*** 
MCFt −0.1057     
(−2.56)*** 
−0.1507 
(−2.74)*** 
 −0.0932 
(−2.16)** 
 −0.1071 
(−1.42) 
 −0.1037  
(−2.58)*** 
MCFt*FC   0.1232 
(1.30) 
 −0.0012 
(−0.14) 
 0.0251 
(0.43) 
 −0.0077 
(−2.61)*** 
FC   −0.0039 
(−0.06) 
     0.0014 
(0.52) 
 −0.0890 
(−2.04)** 
 −0.0007 
(−0.31) 
Numestt 0.0011 
(0.32) 
 0.0005 
(0.14) 
 −0.0021 
(−0.06) 
 −0.0007 
(−0.21) 
 0.0006 
(−0.20) 
R
2
 0.37%  0.48%  0.17%  0.55%  1.55% 
N 1,284  1,126  1,180  1,220  1,282 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. The full sample consists of 642 observations with management 
cash flow forecasts and 642 control firms matched on industry, year, and size without 
management cash flow forecasts. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-
statistics in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level 
using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 9 
The Impact of Management Cash Flow Forecasts on  
Analyst Earnings Forecast Dispersion: 
Dependent Variable = Dispt 
 
 
  Firm Characteristics (FC) 
Full Sample  Bad_Earnd  Distresst−1  Growtht−1  Ind_CFt−1 
Intercept 0.0960 
(11.22)*** 
 0.0743 
(7.29)*** 
 0.0845 
(9.98)*** 
 0.0999 
(8.52)*** 
 0.0951 
(11.21)*** 
MCFt −0.0176    
(−2.17)** 
 −0.0150 
(−1.45) 
 −0.0175 
(−2.20)** 
 0.0024 
(0.17) 
 −0.0182    
(−2.26)** 
MCFt*FC   −0.0098 
(−0.56) 
 −0.0002 
(−0.11) 
 −0.0114 
(−1.05) 
 −0.0017    
(−2.79)*** 
FC   0.0414 
(3.31)*** 
 0.0002 
(0.40) 
 −0.0175 
(−2.16)** 
 −0.0000 
(−0.09) 
Numestt −0.0015 
(−2.39)** 
 −0.0008 
(−1.27) 
 −0.0012 
(−1.87)* 
 −0.0011 
(−1.85)* 
 −0.0015 
(−2.38)** 
R
2
 0.72%  1.91%  0.48%  1.82%  1.91% 
N 1,284  1,126  1,180  1,220  1,282 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. The full sample consists of 642 observations with management 
cash flow forecasts and 642 control firms matched on industry, year, and size without 
management cash flow forecasts. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-
statistics in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level 
using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 10 
The Impact of Management Cash Flow Forecasts on the Change 
 in Analyst Earnings Forecast Error: 
Dependent Variable = Δ|FEt| 
 
 
  Firm Characteristics (FC) 
Full Sample  Bad_Earnd  Distresst−1  Growtht−1  Ind_CFt−1 
Intercept 0.0237 
(6.47)*** 
 0.0214 
(4.87)*** 
 0.0238 
(6.44)*** 
 0.0203 
(4.00)*** 
 0.0237 
(6.47)*** 
MCFt −0.0058 
(−1.72)* 
 −0.0090 
(−2.08)** 
 −0.0039 
(−1.14) 
 −0.0023 
(−0.37) 
 −0.0057 
(−1.70)* 
MCFt*FC   0.0100 
(1.31) 
 0.0004 
(0.73) 
 −0.0013 
(−0.27) 
 0.0004 
(1.40) 
FC   0.0096 
(1.81)* 
 0.0001 
(0.73) 
 0.0043 
(1.22) 
 −0.0001 
(−0.89) 
Numestt 0.0000 
(0.14) 
 0.0001 
(0.30) 
 −0.0002 
(−0.66) 
 −0.0003 
(−1.26) 
 0.0000 
(0.12) 
R
2
 0.11%  1.83%  −0.07%  0.14%   0.10% 
N 920  842  866  890  920 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. The full sample consists of 460 observations with management 
cash flow forecasts and 460 control firms matched on industry, year, and size without 
management cash flow forecasts. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-
statistics in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level 
using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 11 
The Impact of Management Cash Flow Forecasts on the Change  
in Analyst Earnings Forecast Dispersion: 
Dependent Variable = ΔDispt 
 
 
  Firm Characteristics (FC) 
Full Sample  Bad_Earnd  Distresst−1  Growtht−1  Ind_CFt−1 
Intercept 0.0076 
(5.37)*** 
 0.0097 
(5.64)*** 
 0.0073 
(5.03)*** 
 0.0082 
(4.05)*** 
 0.0075 
(5.29)*** 
MCFt −0.0026 
(−2.03)** 
 −0.0054 
(−3.23)*** 
 −0.0019 
(−1.44) 
 −0.0005 
(−0.19) 
 −0.0026 
(−1.99)** 
MCFt*FC   0.0080 
(2.66)*** 
 −0.0003 
(−1.25) 
 −0.0015 
(−0.81) 
 0.0001 
(1.33) 
FC   −0.00402 
(−1.94)** 
 0.0001 
(1.12) 
 −0.0002 
(−0.12) 
 
 −0.0002 
(−3.04)*** 
Numestt 0.0001 
(0.51) 
 0.0000 
(0.225) 
 0.0000 
(0.21) 
 −0.0000 
(−0.14) 
 0.0001 
(0.57) 
R
2
 0.26%  0.90%  0.10%  0.09%  1.08% 
N 920  842  866  890  920 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. The full sample consists of 460 observations with management 
cash flow forecasts and 460 control firms matched on industry, year, and size without 
management cash flow forecasts. Amounts reported are regression coefficients (with t-
statistics in parentheses). *, **, *** indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level 
using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 12 
The Impact of Management Cash Flow Forecasts on  
Analyst Earnings Forecast Properties 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 |FEt|  Dispt  Δ|FEt|  ΔDispt 
Intercept 0.4998 
(6.18)*** 
 0.0959 
(7.16)*** 
 0.1689 
(1.75)* 
 0.0631 
(1.88)* 
MCFt −0.2897 
(−3.03)*** 
 −0.0249 
(−1.57) 
 −0.0810 
(−0.70) 
 −0.0322 
(−0.80) 
MCFt*Bad_Earnd 0.1158 
(1.18) 
 −0.0139 
(−0.85) 
 −0.1816 
(−1.51) 
 −0.0455 
(−1.09) 
MCFt*Distresst−1 0.0125 
(0.84) 
 0.0025 
(1.04) 
 0.0076 
(0.44) 
 0.0014 
(0.24) 
MCFt*Growtht−1 0.1211 
(1.77)* 
 0.0057 
(0.50) 
 0.0631 
(0.78) 
 0.0283 
(1.00) 
MCFt*Ind_CFt−1 −0.0067 
(−1.81)* 
 −0.0018 
(−2.85)*** 
 −0.0168 
(−3.86)*** 
 −0.0007 
(−0.46) 
Bad_Earnd  −0.0294 
(−0.42) 
 0.0289 
(2.48)*** 
 0.2225 
(2.65)*** 
 0.0434 
(1.48) 
Distresst−1 0.0015 
(0.54) 
 0.0002 
(0.40) 
 −0.0015 
(−0.48) 
 −0.0002 
(−0.17) 
Growtht−1  −0.1630 
(−3.08)*** 
 −0.0223 
(−2.55)*** 
 −0.0824 
(−1.31) 
 −0.0355 
(−1.62) 
Ind_CFt−1  −0.0025 
(−0.80) 
 −0.0002 
(−0.32) 
 −0.0004 
(−0.11) 
 −0.0003 
(−0.36) 
Numestt 0.0009 
(0.26) 
 −0.0008 
(−1.37) 
 −0.0055 
(−1.17) 
 −0.0006 
(−0.36) 
R
2
 2.68%  5.11%  4.97%  −0.28% 
N 1,022  1,022  860  860 
_________________________ 
See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile 
unless noted otherwise. The sample for the level (change) model consists of 511 (430) 
observations with management cash flow forecasts and 511 (430) control firms 
matched on industry, year, and size without management cash flow forecasts. Amounts 
reported are regression coefficients (with t-statistics in parentheses). *, **, *** 
indicates significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level using a two-tailed test. 
